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BEYOND FINANCE: PERMISSIBLE COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES OF U.S. FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES
Saule T. Omarova
!is essay explains the legal basis for, and examines public policy implications of, 
recent expansion of large U.S. $nancial holding companies’ non-$nancial business 
activities. Despite its potentially signi$cant impact on economic growth and systemic 
stability, this phenomenon of $nancial conglomeration beyond $nance remains poor-
ly understood. Yet, any truly comprehensive and e#ective reform of $nancial services 
regulation must address public policy issues that arise when “too-big-to-fail” banks 
grow even bigger and more systemically signi$cant by combining $nance with com-
merce.
I. !e Legal Wall Between Banking Commerce
One of the foundational principles underlying the entire system of U.S. bank regu-
lation is the principle of separating banking from general commerce. Since at least 
1863, federally chartered banks have been allowed to engage only in the “business of 
banking,” and therefore prohibited from participating in purely commercial activi-
ties.1 Congress extended the same principle to banks’ parent companies and a6liates, 
when it adopted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.2 !e key policy reasons 
for separating banking from commerce have traditionally included the needs to pre-
serve the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and 
e6cient %ow of credit to productive economic enterprise (by, among other things, 
preventing unfair competition and con%icts of interest), and to prevent excessive con-
centration of $nancial and economic power in the $nancial sector. 
In line with these objectives, the Bank Holding Company Act was originally con-
ceived as an anti-monopoly statute, aimed at preventing excessive concentration of 
economic power in large money center banks.3 Under the Bank Holding Company 
Act regime, all companies that own or control U.S. banks—bank holding companies 
(BHCs)—are generally restricted in their ability to engage, directly or indirectly, in 
any business activities other than banking, managing banks, and certain $nancial ac-
tivities “closely related” to banking.4 
In the 1980s, under pressure from the banking industry trying to regain competi-
tive ground vis-à-vis securities $rms, federal bank regulators began gradually relax-
ing legal constraints on banks’ and BHCs’ non-banking activities. Both the O6ce 
of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve engaged in aggressively 
expansive interpretations of the statutory language, to allow commercial banks and 
BHCs, respectively, to grow their businesses beyond traditional banking. Between the 
mid-1980s and early 2000s, the O6ce of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a 
series of interpretations allowing commercial banks to trade in a wide range of deriva-
tive instruments.5 In a parallel e#ort, the Federal Reserve’s orders allowed BHCs to 
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underwrite and deal in corporate securities, subject to revenue limitations. Moving 
beyond pure $nance, the Federal Reserve amended its regulations, for example, to 
permit BHCs to conduct general data processing, storage, and transmission activities, 
including providing related hardware and other facilities.6
II. !e Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: !ree Doors in the Wall7
!is era of expanding BHC-permissible activities through administrative action 
culminated in the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which partially 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed a6liation between commercial and in-
vestment banks under the new $nancial holding company (“FHC”) structure. !e 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act to allow certain 
qualifying BHCs that elect an FHC status to conduct (through their non-bank sub-
sidiaries) a much wider range of “$nancial in nature” activities, including unlimited 
securities dealing and underwriting as well as general insurance business. FHCs were 
envisioned as “$nancial supermarkets” serving as a “one-stop-shop” for their custom-
ers’ $nancial needs. !is structural reform profoundly altered the key dynamics in the 
U.S. $nancial sector, unleashing a wave of consolidations and the emergence of large, 
diversi$ed $nancial conglomerates such as Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of 
America. 
!e Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also signi$cantly expanded the range of non-$nancial 
activities permissible for this new breed of bank-centered $nancial services conglom-
erates. By allowing FHCs to enter purely commercial business lines, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act quietly dealt a potentially deadly blow to the concept of separating 
banking from commerce. Even now, more than a decade later, it is di6cult to assess 
fully the implications of this shift in the legal and regulatory regime governing bank-
ing institutions. Yet, its importance for understanding the sources and patterns of 
systemic risk in today’s $nancial sector is becoming increasingly clear.
!ree principal provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, as amended by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, enable FHCs to engage in commercial activities on a much 
broader scale than before 1999. First, an FHC may make passive private equity in-
vestments of any size in any commercial company under the “merchant banking” 
authority.8 Second, an FHC may directly engage in any non-$nancial activities, if the 
Federal Reserve determines such activities are “complementary” to a $nancial activity.9 
Finally, the statute contains a grandfather clause to allow entities that become subject 
to the Bank Holding Company Act after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley enactment to run 
physical commodity businesses.10 An FHC may use any one of these statutory autho-
rizations to conduct a particular commercial activity.
Each of these three statutory exemptions from the general ban on banking organiza-
tions’ non-$nancial operations—or three “doors” into previously inaccessible sphere 
of pure commerce—is subject to various conditions and limitations. However, a closer 
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look at the language, origins, and subsequent implementation of these provisions re-
veals how weak these formal protections can be in practice.
A. Door No. 1: Merchant Banking
Prior to 1999, a BHC was generally permitted to make passive private equity invest-
ments in any commercial company only if such investments did not exceed 5 percent 
of such company’s voting securities.11 In the 1990s, banks viewed this as a major com-
petitive disadvantage that kept them from making potentially lucrative private equity 
investments in start-up Internet and high-tech companies. Section 4(k)(4)(H) of the 
Bank Holding Company Act, added by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, sought to rem-
edy that situation by permitting FHCs to acquire or control, directly or indirectly, up 
to 100 percent of ownership interest in any commercial entity under the “merchant 
banking” authority. 
!e statute does not de$ne the term “merchant banking.” In 2001, the Federal Re-
serve and the Department of Treasury jointly issued the Merchant Banking Rule, 
which de$nes merchant banking as a catch-all authorization for FHCs to invest in 
commercial enterprises, as long as any such investment meets several requirements.12 
!us, the investment cannot be held through an FHC’s bank-subsidiary and must be 
sold within 10 to 15 years after the acquisition (barring any special circumstances). 
!e investment must be made “as part of a bona $de underwriting or merchant or 
investment banking activity” (i.e. it must be a $nancial investment for the purpose of 
appreciation and ultimate resale). Furthermore, an FHC cannot “routinely manage or 
operate” any portfolio company in which it made the investment, except as may be 
necessary in order to obtain a reasonable return on investment upon resale.
!ese requirements were designed to ensure that FHCs use the merchant banking 
powers to facilitate their $nancial intermediation activities, as opposed to getting in-
volved in the commercial businesses of companies in which they invest. Although an 
FHC is permitted to acquire full ownership of a commercial $rm, the principal pur-
pose of its investment must remain purely $nancial: making a pro$t upon subsequent 
resale or disposition of its ownership stake. 
!e real question is whether, in practice, FHCs comply with the rule’s formal re-
quirements while circumventing its intended purpose—that is, to what extent they 
are able to use merchant banking authority as a means of engaging in impermissible 
commercial activities. For instance, in general discussions of FHCs’ merchant banking 
activities, the statutory prohibition on “routinely managing” portfolio companies is 
often understood as a requirement—and an e#ective assurance—of a purely passive 
“arm’s length” relationship between an FHC and commercial entities it controls under 
that authority. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. !e regulators interpreted the term 
“routinely managing” narrowly, leaving ample opportunities for FHCs to exercise de-
cisive managerial control over their portfolio companies. Under the Merchant Bank-
ing Rule, the indicia of impermissible “routine management” of a portfolio company 
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include certain kinds of management interlocking and explicit contractual restrictions 
on the portfolio company’s ability to make routine business decisions (e.g., hiring 
non-executive personnel or entering into transactions in the ordinary course of busi-
ness).13 Examples of permissible arrangements that do not constitute “routine man-
agement” include contractual agreements restricting the portfolio company’s ability to 
take actions not in the ordinary course of business; providing $nancial, investment, 
and management consulting advice to, and underwriting securities of, the portfolio 
company; and meeting with the company’s employees to monitor or advise them in 
connection with the portfolio company’s performance or activities.14 FHCs can also 
elect any or all of the directors of any portfolio company, as long as the board does not 
directly run the company’s day-to-day operations.15 
!us, unwrapping regulatory interpretation of the statutory language reveals that 
FHCs enjoy considerable %exibility in directing business a#airs of portfolio compa-
nies in which they invest pursuant to merchant banking authority. In practice, it is not 
di6cult to structure an FHC’s relationship with any particular commercial entity in a 
way that avoids formal indicia of “routine management” but gives it e#ective control 
over important substantive aspects of that entity’s business.
B. Door No. 2: Complementary to Finance
!e Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also authorizes FHCs to conduct commercial activities 
determined by the Federal Reserve to be “complementary” to a $nancial activity. !e 
Federal Reserve must also determine that any such complementary activity does not 
“pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the 
$nancial system generally.”16 Once again, however, the statute does not de$ne what 
complementary means.
Procedurally, the Federal Reserve makes these determinations on a case-by-case basis. 
Any FHC seeking to engage in any commercial activity it believes to be complemen-
tary to a $nancial activity must apply for the Federal Reserve’s prior approval and pro-
vide detailed information about the proposed activity.17 In making its determination, 
the Federal Reserve is required to make a speci$c $nding that the proposed activity 
would produce public bene$ts that outweigh its potential adverse e#ects.18 !e statu-
tory list of such public bene$ts includes “greater convenience, increased competition, 
or gains in e6ciency.”19 !e Federal Reserve must balance these bene$ts against such 
dangers as “undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, con-
%icts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the United 
States banking or $nancial system.”20 !is list of potential dangers directly channels 
the policy concerns underlying the principle of separation of banking from com-
merce, which indicates Congress’s intention to limit FHCs’ potential expansion into 
the commercial sphere. Yet, the statutory language leaves too many opportunities for 
interpreting public bene$ts too broadly and potential risks too narrowly. 
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!e legislative history of this provision shows that the industry deliberately sought 
the inclusion of the complementary clause as an open-ended source of legal authority 
for banking organizations to engage in any commercial activities that may become 
feasible or pro$table in the future. Again, banks’ real goal was to be able to invest in 
Internet and high-tech companies. Yet, the industry framed the congressional debate 
on complementary activities as a debate primarily about low-risk, low-pro$le activi-
ties, such as publishing travel magazines and using back-o6ce over-capacity to o#er 
telephone help lines.21
After 1999, the banking industry found other, less innocuous uses for this complemen-
tary power, such as physical commodity and energy trading.22 Beginning in 2003, the 
Federal Reserve issued several orders allowing Citigroup, JPMorgan, Bank of America, 
and other FHCs to trade in a wide range of physical commodities as an activity com-
plementary to their commodity derivatives businesses. In making its determinations, 
the Federal Reserve routinely equated the public bene$ts of proposed activities with 
the primarily private bene$ts to individual FHCs—their enhanced competitiveness 
and pro$tability.23 With respect to potential adverse e#ects, the orders typically brie%y 
noted the absence of any substantial risks to the safety and soundness of the FHC or 
the U.S. $nancial system.
!e main safety and soundness limitation the Federal Reserve imposed on these activi-
ties was the prohibition on FHC ownership or operation of facilities for the extrac-
tion, storage, processing, or transportation of physical commodities.24 In response, 
FHCs developed ways to obtain e#ective operational control of power plants and oil 
re$neries through contractual arrangements. In the wake of the recent crisis, when 
three large FHCs – Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan – emerged as 
major commodity merchants and owners of oil pipelines and metals warehouses, the 
Federal Reserve’s original line drawing began to seem even less relevant in practice. 
More generally, this selective expansion of large FHCs into commodities and ener-
gy—vitally important and volatile sectors of the economy that are inherently vulner-
able to market manipulation and speculative bubbles—raises fundamental questions 
as to whether the vague regulatory concept of complementarity imposes meaningful 
limits on banking organizations’ commercial activities.
C. Door No. 3: “Grandfathered” Commodity Activities
!e third source of authority for FHCs to enter commerce is section 4(o) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act, which authorizes any company that becomes an FHC after 
November 12, 1999, to continue “activities related to the trading, sale, or investment 
in commodities and underlying physical properties,” if that company “lawfully was 
engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as of September 30, 1997, in 
the United States.”25 
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!us, section 4(o) seems to allow a qualifying FHC to conduct virtually any kind of 
commodity trading and any related commercial activities (for example, owning and 
operating oil terminals and metals warehouses), if it happened to conduct any com-
modities business—even if on a very limited basis and/or involving di#erent kinds of 
commodities—prior to the 1997 cut-o# date. Potentially, so broadly stated an exemp-
tion may open the door for large $nancial institutions to conduct sizeable commercial 
activities of a kind typically not allowed for banking organizations.26
Grandfathering of pre-existing commodities operations was originally proposed in 
1995 by Congressman Jim Leach as part of a broader set of provisions establishing a 
new charter for “wholesale $nancial institutions” (“WFIs”) that could conduct a wide 
range of banking activities but could not take federally-insured retail deposits.27 !e 
proposal sought to create a “two-way street” for investment banks, enabling them to 
acquire commercial banks and o#er wholesale banking services to institutional clients, 
without becoming subject to the full range of activity restrictions under the Bank 
Holding Company Act.28 Because WFIs and their parent-companies—“woo$es”—
would not have access to federal deposit insurance and, therefore, were not likely to 
pose any signi$cant potential threat to the deposit insurance fund, the proposal au-
thorized them to engage in a broader set of non-$nancial activities than regular FHCs 
backed by FDIC insurance. One of these explicit trade-o#s involved the grandfather-
ing of woo$es’ pre-existing commodities trading.
Initially, several big banks and securities $rms strongly pushed for the passage of the 
woo$e charter.29 Unlike the House bill, the Senate version of the reform legislation 
did not contain woo$e provisions. In April 1999, Senator Phil Gramm introduced an 
amendment replicating the commodity grandfathering provision for woo$es in the 
House bill, but without any reference to woo$es.30 Ultimately, the entire subtitle of 
the House bill dealing with the new woo$e charter was eliminated from the legisla-
tion. !e Senate’s broader version of the commodity grandfathering clause, however, 
became the current section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company Act. !us, an initially 
limited concession to $nancial institutions that were explicitly denied access to federal 
deposit insurance became an open-ended exemption available to all newly-registered 
FHCs fully backed by the federal government guarantees.
!is commodity grandfathering provision remained largely unnoticed until Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, which became BHCs in September 2008, claimed it 
as the legal basis for keeping and expanding their vast operations in physical com-
modities and energy markets. !e controversy over this issue brought section 4(o) to 
the forefront of the public debate on the proper limits of banking institutions’ non-
$nancial activities and the dangers of failing to police these limits in practice.
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III. From Financial Conglomerates to Financial-Industrial Conglomerates?
Potential Public Policy Implications
As the preceding discussion shows, the post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regime gov-
erning FHCs’ commercial activities does not provide e#ective constraints on such 
activities. It is not surprising that, since the early 2000s, large U.S. bank-centered 
$nancial conglomerates—such as JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—
have been gradually morphing into $nancial-industrial conglomerates. !is trend is 
especially visible in physical commodity and energy markets, in which these FHCs 
conduct signi$cant operations producing, processing, transporting, storing, and mar-
keting oil, gas, electricity, coal, uranium, aluminum, etc. But large U.S. FHCs may 
also be acquiring stakes in airports, railroads, telecommunications, or defense compa-
nies, we simply don’t know.
!e Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the cen-
terpiece of the U.S. $nancial regulation reform, does not directly address the question 
of whether, or to what extent, $nancial institutions should engage in commercial 
activities. While the Dodd-Frank Act generally endorses the continuing signi$cance 
of the foundational principle of separation of banking and commerce, its main focus 
remains on $nancial activities and markets. Establishing e#ective regulatory boundar-
ies for $nancial $rms’ non-$nancial activities and eliminating the current disconnect 
between legal principles and reality is a task for future reforms.
In the absence of full and reliable information on FHCs’ commercial activities and 
their impact on $nancial and commercial markets, it is di6cult to o#er speci$c policy 
prescriptions for such reforms. However, as an initial matter, it is helpful to de$ne the 
range of potential public policy implications of large, systemically important FHCs’ 
large-scale involvement in commercial enterprise and to articulate key policy objec-
tives that should guide our search for solutions.
!ere are several policy reasons to revisit the existing legal framework for allowing 
banking entities to conduct non-$nancial activities. Some of these reasons re%ect the 
heightened relevance of the traditional policies behind the principle of separating 
banking from commerce in the complex and interconnected world of modern $nance. 
!ese are concerns about safety and soundness of $nancial institutions and systemic 
risk associated with their commercial activities, potential leakage of the public subsidy 
beyond the banking sector, market integrity and consumer protection, and excessive 
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of $nancial conglomer-
ates. In addition, there are serious reasons to doubt the actual capacity of $nancial in-
stitutions and their regulators to monitor and e#ectively control potential risks posed 
by such institutions’ ever-expanding activities. 
!ese theoretical concerns may be more or less pronounced in the context of a par-
ticular commercial activity. It is also worth noting that banks’ involvement in certain 
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non-$nancial activities may—and often does—produce tangible $nancial bene$ts to 
their clients and, indirectly and perhaps less tangibly, to society as a whole. Yet, after 
decades of unquestioning acceptance of private $rms’ self-interested depiction of such 
bene$ts, it is critical that policy makers fully address potential social costs of mixing 
banking and commerce.
A. Safety and Soundness of Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk
It is often asserted that separating banking from commerce undermines banking in-
stitutions’ safety and soundness by preventing them from diversifying their sources of 
income. !is argument, however, is meaningless if stated in the abstract, as a generally 
applicable principle. Some forms of diversi$cation may, in fact, produce desired eco-
nomic bene$ts for an FHC, while others may have the opposite e#ects by exposing it 
to too much risk, often in unfamiliar ways. !e task, therefore, is to determine which 
types of commercial investments and activities are likely to generate signi$cant diver-
si$cation bene$ts without, at the same time, undermining the safety and soundness of 
the individual FHC or the entire $nancial system. 
Large FHCs’ involvement in physical commodities and energy markets provides a 
useful example of how certain commercial activities may raise potentially signi$cant 
safety and soundness concerns and exacerbate systemic risk. Let us assume that own-
ing or operating oil pipelines and metals warehouses generates pro$ts for an FHC that 
are both independent from, and signi$cant enough to o#set serious downturns in, its 
core $nancial-market business. !is diversi$cation e#ort also exposes the FHC to a 
broader range of risks, many of which are qualitatively di#erent from risks posed by 
its traditional $nancial activities. It’s easy to imagine, for example, that an accident or 
explosion on board an oil tanker owned or operated by one of JPMorgan’s subsidiaries 
causes a large oil spill in an environmentally fragile area of the ocean. !e news of the 
disaster may lead JPMorgan’s counterparties in the $nancial markets to worry about 
the $rm’s $nancial strength and creditworthiness. !e full extent of JPMorgan’s clean 
up costs and legal liabilities would be di6cult to estimate upfront, so it would be 
reasonable for the $rm’s counterparties to worry about its $nancial strength and cred-
itworthiness. !is could trigger a run on the $rm’s assets and bring JPMorgan to the 
verge of a major liquidity crisis. Without some form of a bailout, its failure is nearly 
certain to cause a major systemic disturbance in the $nancial markets. 
!is hypothetical illustrates how FHC’s expansion into physical commodity and en-
ergy businesses creates new sources of, and transmission channels for, systemic risk in 
the $nancial sector. Systemic vulnerability is likely to increase whenever FHCs enter, 
on a su6ciently large scale, any commercial business and, as a result, become exposed 
to $nancial, operational, and market risks speci$c to such business. !erefore, any po-
tential bene$t from diversifying an FHC’s portfolio beyond $nance must be weighted 
against potential costs of increasing the overall level of institutional and systemic risk.
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B. Leakage of Public Subsidy
By taking deposits and serving as the main channel for the %ow of payments and credit 
throughout the economy, banks perform a “special” public service. For this reason, 
the federal government subsidizes banking institutions by guaranteeing their deposit 
liabilities and providing them with liquidity support through dedicated Federal Re-
serve facilities. Big, systemically important banks and their a6liates also enjoy implicit 
subsidy, based on the market expectation that the government would bail out any 
such entity in order to avoid $nancial meltdown.31 As a result of this public support, 
explicit or implicit, banking organizations have lower cost of funding than ordinary 
commercial companies, which potentially gives FHCs a crucial advantage over their 
non-bank competitors in any non-$nancial market. 
Commodities markets, again, provide a classic example. !e $nancial industry often 
asserts that banks’ entry into commercial sectors provides public bene$ts by increasing 
competition and by enabling them to provide better, more e6cient services to their 
clients. What these claims leave out, however, is the potential competitive advantage 
that the federal subsidy of banking institutions gives them when they act in com-
modity markets. An oil re$nery may very well bene$t from a lower cost of its crude 
inventory supplied entirely by Morgan Stanley, but is Morgan Stanley able to o#er the 
lower price because its own cost of funding is partly subsidized by the taxpayer? If it is 
so, the taxpaying public is indirectly subsidizing the re$nery’s costs of doing its busi-
ness—something Congress has never endorsed or even contemplated.
To protect the taxpayers from unknowingly supporting private $rms’ pro$t-generating 
activities, it is critical to impose strict limitations on the ability of banking institutions 
to leverage their access to federal subsidy. Despite the existence of laws attempting 
to do just that, in practice, it remains a di6cult task.32 Once banks venture beyond 
$nance, the market-distorting e#ects of the subsidy leakage become even harder to 
detect and control. 
C. Con%icts of Interest, Market Manipulation and Consumer Protection
One of the key policy reasons for separating banking from commerce is the fear of 
banks unfairly restricting their commercial-market competitors’ access to credit, the 
lifeblood of the economy. Banks can also use their $nancial power to in%uence prices 
in commercial markets in which their a6liates operate. !e relatively recent growth of 
global derivatives markets, in which large U.S. FHCs are key participants, raises these 
concerns with potential con%icts of interest and market manipulation to a qualitative-
ly new level. If the same FHC trades derivatives linked to the price of some underly-
ing asset and, at the same time, through its commercial operations, can in%uence the 
supply of, or demand for, that asset, that FHC can intentionally move the underlying 
asset’s price to maximize gains from its derivatives positions. 
!is structural market power from combining derivatives trading with direct partici-
pation in related commercial activities creates both incentives and opportunities for 
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new, more subtle, and harder to detect forms of manipulative conduct across di#erent 
markets. Furthermore, FHC a6liates acting in various commercial markets in pursuit 
of their parents’ complex trading strategies may fundamentally alter the dynamics 
within those markets, creating sudden price changes not explained by the traditional 
supply-and-demand factors. !ese destabilizing e#ects of “$nancialization” of com-
mercial markets often translate into higher consumer prices. Recent revelations about 
Goldman Sachs’ role in arti$cially in%ating aluminum prices, through its metals ware-
housing operations, provide one example of this troubling trend.
D. Political Economy
Writing almost a century ago, Justice Brandeis famously warned against the dangers 
of allowing $nancial institutions to accumulate direct control over industrial enter-
prises.33 !e recent $nancial crisis underscored the continuing salience of Brandeis’s 
political-economy concerns. One of the central themes in post-crisis regulatory re-
form is the prevention of future bailouts of “too big to fail” $nancial institutions. Yet, 
if large U.S. $nancial institutions successfully transform themselves into $nancial-
industrial conglomerates, it would make the reformers’ task even less enviable. Not 
only will these giant $rms become even bigger and more complex, they will acquire 
additional sources of leverage over the economy—and, consequently, the polity—in 
their new role as providers of vital commercial products and services.
E. Firm Governability and Regulatory Capacity
Signi$cant expansion of FHCs’ commercial businesses presents serious challenges for 
these $rms’ internal governance and risk management. Large U.S. $nancial conglom-
erates are already complex in terms of their corporate structure, risk management, and 
the breadth and depth of $nancial services and products they o#er. Allowing these 
$rms to run extensive commercial operations that require specialized technical and 
managerial expertise adds to their internal complexity. Firm-wide coordination and 
monitoring of operations, $nances, risks, and legal and regulatory compliance become 
all the more di6cult in that context. 
Furthermore, mixing banking with commerce creates potentially insurmountable 
challenges from the perspective of regulatory e6ciency and capacity. !e U.S. system 
of $nancial services regulation is already fragmented and ill suited to detect and reduce 
systemic risk across di#erent $nancial markets and products. !e expansion of FHCs’ 
activities into new areas subject to extensive regulation under very di#erent regulatory 
schemes—environmental regulation, workplace safety regulation, consumer safety 
regulation, etc.—lays the foundation for jurisdictional con%icts on an unprecedented 
scale. In addition to the several federal $nancial regulators, banking organizations 
may become subject to direct regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Transportation, and numerous 
other federal and state agencies. Yet, none of these many overseers will see the whole 
picture, leaving potentially dangerous gaps in the regulation and supervision of these 
companies. 
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Non-$nancial regulatory schemes are not designed to address the unique risks—en-
terprise-wide and systemic—posed by the activities of systemically important $nan-
cial institutions. Financial regulators, in turn, lack the necessary expertise and legal 
authority to exercise meaningful oversight of FHCs’ commercial businesses and the 
risks they generate. !is natural limit on regulatory capacity is a critical factor in the 
discussion of $nancial institutions’ entry into non-$nancial lines of business.
IV. What Should Be Done? Potential Avenues for Reform
At present, there is surprisingly little public information on the nature and scope of 
banking organizations’ commercial assets and activities. FHCs’ public $lings do not 
provide a su6ciently detailed picture, and it is not clear whether the Federal Reserve 
collects enough data to give it a comprehensive view of their merchant banking and 
complementary activities. !us, the $rst step toward developing a coherent regulatory 
approach to commercial activities of banking organizations is to demand more speci$c 
and targeted public disclosure of all relevant information. Once we have a better idea 
of how involved our banking institutions are in non-$nancial businesses, we can de-
cide whether such involvement warrants any particular policy intervention.
 
As a general matter, intervention could proceed along three lines: (1) strengthening 
the existing regime by imposing additional regulatory controls on FHC’s ability to 
enter commerce; (2) eliminating speci$c authorizations of FHCs’ commercial activi-
ties; and (3) folding this issue into a broader structural reform of $nancial services 
regulation.
A. “Policing the Doors”
!e least radical policy response would seek to improve practical e6cacy of the exist-
ing regime by imposing stricter and more meaningful regulatory controls on FHCs’ 
commercial activities.
Size and concentration limits
One possible step in this direction would be to impose additional size and concentra-
tion limits on FHCs’ permissible merchant banking and complementary activities. 
!e relevant measures and thresholds may vary, and the Federal Reserve should have 
%exibility to determine whether the size, scope, or relative signi$cance of any indi-
vidual FHCs’ commercial holdings and/or activities—as represented by any single or 
multiple metrics—reach potentially worrisome levels. In order to be meaningful, these 
limitations would have to target all of the substantive policy concerns outlined above. 
Given the breadth of what constitutes commerce, it may be desirable to identify spe-
ci$c sectors or areas of activity, which are critically important to economic growth 
and/or potentially vulnerable to speculation-induced instability, and to craft addi-
tional limitations and conditions on FHCs’ expansion into such areas. For example, 
additional safeguards could be imposed on FHCs’ activities in physical commodities, 
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real estate, telecommunications, as well as infrastructure and transportation. !e list 
of such “special concern” activities, and activity-speci$c limitations, may be adjusted 
by policy makers, if necessary.
Rede$ning supervisory objectives
!e Federal Reserve should be required to (1) collect more granular quantitative and 
qualitative data on each FHC’s merchant banking investments and complementary 
activities, and (2) monitor compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements 
much more closely. !e agency’s principal supervisory goal should be to understand 
and evaluate not only each FHC’s full commercial-activity pro$le but also the overall 
pattern and potential e#ects (internal and external) of combining its commercial and 
$nancial activities. 
In evaluating compliance, Federal Reserve examiners must not rely on review of FHCs’ 
corporate documents and formal “policies and procedures.” For instance, with respect 
to merchant banking, examiners should scrutinize the actual relationships between 
each FHC and its portfolio companies, in order to ensure that the FHC’s merchant 
banking portfolio contains only $nancial-in-nature investments. !e examiners’ task 
would be to monitor the relationship between an FHC and each of its merchant 
banking portfolio companies for the indicia of de facto operational in%uence that 
potentially cross the line between $nancing commerce and engaging in commerce.
Portfolio-level reporting
To this end, the Federal Reserve could require that each commercial company con-
trolled by an FHC pursuant to merchant banking authority regularly provide quanti-
tative and qualitative information detailing all of its business dealings with the FHC 
or its clients (e.g., percentage of the company’s revenues generated from such dealings, 
lists of business contracts with the FHC or its clients, speci$c information on FHC’s 
participation in the management and business decisions of the company). To ease 
the administrative burden, this portfolio-level reporting requirement may be applied 
selectively to portfolio companies engaged either in any “special concern” activity (as 
outlined above) or an activity in which the FHC’s investment exceed certain concen-
tration thresholds. 
!e same type of reporting may be mandated with respect to FHCs’ commercial sub-
sidiaries engaged in complementary activities. While the speci$c purpose of supervi-
sory scrutiny in this context is somewhat di#erent than in the case of FHCs’ merchant 
banking portfolio, the overall goal is fundamentally similar: to ascertain the extent to 
which an FHC’s commercial activities indicate any potentially troubling micro- or 
macro-trends. 
Procedural safeguards 
!e existing scheme for complementary activities can be further strengthened by im-
posing additional procedural requirements on the Federal Reserve’s decision making. 
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For example, the Bank Holding Company Act can be amended to require the Federal 
Reserve to provide a more detailed substantive justi$cation of its determination that 
the public bene$ts—which are not to be equated with pro$tability and competitive 
gains of FHCs—of allowing a particular FHC to engage in a speci$c complementary 
activity outweigh all of the potential adverse e#ects speci$ed in the statute (and not 
only those directly related to individual institutions’ safety and soundness). Putting 
these implicit requirements directly into the words of the statute would make it more 
likely that the Federal Reserve ful$lls its responsibilities as the guardian of the public 
interest.
It is also desirable to mandate periodic regulatory reviews and re-authorizations of 
each order granting individual FHCs’ requests to conduct commercial activities com-
plementary to $nance. In e#ect, this requirement would create an automatic “sunset” 
period (e.g., every $ve years) for complementary power grants, which would force the 
Federal Reserve to reconsider its decisions in light of new information. Again, in issu-
ing re-authorization orders, the Federal Reserve should be required to lay out in full 
the substantive reasoning behind its decision.
B. “Closing the Doors”
A more radical policy response would be to repeal speci$c statutory authorizations of 
FHCs’ commercial activities created by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In contrast to 
the option outlined above, this option is less complicated and does not create signi$-
cant compliance and administrative costs.
!e easiest case for such outright repeal is section 4(o) of the Bank Holding Company 
Act. !is commodity grandfathering provision has outlived its original purpose and 
does not serve any real function today. 
!ere is also a potentially strong argument for repealing the statutory authorization of 
FHCs’ merchant banking activities. As discussed above, the banking industry sought 
the inclusion of this authority in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to enable it to invest 
in Silicon Valley start-ups. Today, long after the dotcom boom ended, FHCs can use 
this provision to conduct commercial activities that go far beyond the vague statutory 
concept of “bona $de merchant banking.” Given the practical di6culty of ensur-
ing compliance with the spirit and purpose of this provision, it would make sense 
to reassess whether the real public bene$ts of allowing banking organizations to act 
as private equity funds outweigh potential risks such activities pose from the public 
policy perspective.
C. “!e Wall is the Problem!”
Finally, the most radical approach to resolving the existing tension between the legal 
principle of separation of banking from commerce, on the one hand, and its inconsis-
tent implementation, on the other, would be to reconsider the principle itself.
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!is approach could support abandoning the legal $ction of separating banking from 
commerce and legalizing $nancial-industrial conglomeration under the rubric of “uni-
versal banking.” Alternatively, it could support a call for broader structural reforms 
seeking more e#ective separation of $nance from commerce. !e former version of 
this paradigm shift, while potentially restoring doctrinal consistency, is not likely to 
address policy concerns discussed above. !e latter version, however, might ultimately 
hold the key to resolving many a regulatory dilemma in modern $nance. Developing a 
coherent system of new regulatory categories that re%ect today’s market realities better 
than old-style “walls” and “silos” could enable new solutions tailored more precisely to 
speci$c policy problems. 
One of the fundamental questions in this respect concerns the social functions and 
boundaries of $nancial intermediation. Financial institutions’ growing involvement 
in commercial activities blurs these boundaries, so that it is not clear any more where 
$nancial intermediation ends and trade intermediation begins—and what regulatory 
implications should follow. !e recent growth of derivatives markets intensi$ed this 
conceptual ambiguity by enabling the rise of new, hybrid intermediaries that seam-
lessly combine $nancial risk management services with large-scale commercial enter-
prise, often without being subject to full-blown regulation as $nancial intermediaries. 
Resolving this fundamental ambiguity, however, is a di6cult task. Much work needs 
to be done before we can outline a realistic path toward a new structural paradigm in 
$nancial regulation. Understanding where we are today and how we got here is the 
necessary $rst step on that path.
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